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The Disgraced Life in J. M. Coetzee’s Dusklands 
Steven Groarke 
…I levelled 
And blew the small hour through his heart. 
Ian Duhig, “The Lammas Hireling” 
 
There is an inherent tension between literature and psychoanalysis as distinct 
but overlapping perspectives on inwardness. It is important that we credit the 
specificity of these two perspectives, while at the same time exploring the potential 
for productive overlap. By “overlap” I mean those occasions when two relatively 
autonomous forms of understanding intersect, usually, on account of a common 
problem or theme, if not a comparable attitude towards a given problem. In this essay, 
I present a close reading of J.M. Coetzee’s Dusklands along these lines, with respect 
to the “inner workings” of narrative fiction, on the one hand, and to the overlap 
between psychoanalysis and literature in Coetzee’s defining preoccupation with the 
“psychic” deformations of violence and brutality, on the other (Coetzee, 1987, 
2007a). I do not propose to define “inwardness” in the abstract. The essay is 
presented as a literary-critical reconstruction of a particular attitude towards the inner 
life rather than a general philosophical argument. 
 Coetzee is not in any meaningful sense of the word a “psychological” 
novelist. The interior life is presented in his novels as the cumulative effect of so 
many discursive configurations or language games. This interplay of process and 
patterning, which comes to the fore in Coetzee’s various forms of self-referential 
storytelling, includes the internal configuration of anxiety, which I treat in the 
colonial context, as a type of religious anxiety. In particular, I identify the inner 
workings of violence, in this historical and political context, with the horror of 
aloneness, an ineradicable sense of longing in the absence of God. Of course, the 
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predicament of living a disgraced, forsaken life is hardly confined to the characters in 
Coetzee’s novels. My aim is to demonstrate the extent to which Coetzee is centrally 
concerned with a wider formation of interiority, a modern inner life haunted by an 
intolerable nothingness. 
I. Mythography 
Coetzee’s first work of fiction, Dusklands, published in South African in 
1974, comprises two novellas: “The Vietnam Project” and “The Narrative of Jacobus 
Coetzee.” The stories are linked by the prevalence of a certain narrative voice, an 
inner articulation of despair coupled with a delirious longing for salvation. The 
combined sense of despair and longing involves a paranoid setup in which the act of 
saving is inextricably linked to annihilation. Set out initially in these two stories, the 
persecutory arrangement of despair and longing may be seen as the central 
predicament in Coetzee’s novels. Writing out of their separate fates, as Coetzee puts 
it in the postscript to Elizabeth Costello (2003, p. 230), the characters in his novels, 
past and present, give voice to a wish for salvation alongside a realization of their 
damnation. In Dusklands, this setup reveals itself explicitly as a formation of 
nihilism, an abortive gulf or blankness above which defensive patterns of movement 
continue to unfold. 
 Starting with “The Vietnam Project,” the text consists of a confessional, 
autobiographical narrative by an expert in psychological warfare, Eugene Dawn, 
reporting to the Department of Defense during the bombing of Vietnam and 
Cambodia in the 1960s and early 1970s. The story may be read profitably as the 
confession of “a sick man” (1974/1982, p.32). Dawn is doing what he can, making 
use of the resources available to him, in an attempt to put together a “core” for 
himself, albeit late in life at the age of thirty-
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Dawn’s use of the term “core?” The extent to which the core is predicated on “a core 
belief” (p. 9) takes us beyond the narrator’s confessional mode of address to the 
central discursive formation of the novella. 
 The story is rooted in a particular discursive context—in which Middlemarch, 
with George Eliot’s Casaubon as the seeker of the “Key to All Mythologies,” may be 
seen as the canonical literary reference—alongside the more explicit interface of 
cultural anthropology and the American military. Edward Said (1989) identifies the 
link between anthropology and the U.S. Department of Defense; similarly, David 
Attwell (1993, pp. 40-41) provides a more immediate link between the Hudson 
Institute studies on national security and international order—Can We Win in 
Vietnam? The American Dilemma (Armbruster, Gastil, Kahn, Pfaff, & Stillman, 
1968)—and Dawn’s report. The core of the narrative is contained in the report, which 
provides a fictive overlap with the psychoanalysis of persecutory anxiety (Klein, 
1946). As such, the narrative voice figures as a self-conscious textual elaboration in a 
particular genre of modern thought, which extends from the work of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century mythographers through theosophy to religious anthropology, 
archaeology, and psychoanalysis (Kidd, 2016). 
 The psychopathology of character is overdetermined by the discourse of 
mythography, which drives the “negative work” of the narrative (Green, 1999). A 
“bookish child,” a child who grew up with books of all kinds, Dawn sees himself now 
“in an honourable line of bookish men who have sat in libraries and had visions of 
great clarity” (1974/1982, p. 29). The delusional quality of this so-called “clarity” is 
expressed in his view of futurity as will to power: “I speak with the voice of things to 
come. I speak in troubled times and tell you how to be as children again. I speak to 
the broken halves of all our selves and tell them to embrace” (pp. 29-30). 
 4 
 Whose voice do we hear in Dawn’s address? Who is the author of these vatic 
words? Who speaks in the will to power? The biblical cadence of these exhortations 
is clear enough; indeed, the voice of Scripture is an integral part of Coetzee’s fiction 
from Dusklands onwards. In a body of work that is uniquely recognizable for its 
series of abject characters, Coetzee demonstrates a complex and ambivalent relation 
to his own experience of Dutch Reformed Calvinism. Vincent Pecora points out that 
Coetzee’s work comprises simultaneously “a furious attack on and an inescapable 
reproduction of the Dutch Reformed Calvinism of his tribe” (2015, p. 92). 
Paradoxically, the repudiation of Dutch Calvinism is driven by a sense of “shame” 
that is rooted in “the spirit of Geneva” (Coetzee, 1990, p. 47). The repudiation, in 
other words, may be seen as a re-enactment of a confessional worldview that appears 
as deeply entrenched in Coetzee as in any able Christian of good faith: “The 
generation of white South Africans to which I belong, and the next generation, and 
perhaps the generation after that too, will go bowed under the shame of the crimes 
that were committed in their name” (2007b, p. 44). 
 How is this ambivalent, shameful attitude played out in the course of the 
novels? What form does the torment take? In “The Vietnam Project,” the 
conventional preoccupations of fictional realism—i..e., the psychology of character, 
first-person present-tense narrative, documentary verisimilitude, and so on—give 
place to an entirely different use of narrative voice. We need to decouple the terms 
“personal” and “inward” in order to understand the delusional core of “The Vietnam 
Project.” The story rests on the fictional interface of counter-will, on the one hand, 
and the subtle variation on counter-myth, on the other. Mythography, Dawn’s 
declared field of expertise and operation, is presented as “an open field like 
philosophy or criticism because it has not yet found a methodology to lose itself 
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forever in the mazes of” (1974/1982, p. 31). The “open field” and the “will to power” 
may be seen as mutually dependent discursive conditions of Dawn’s modern 
revisionary counter-myth. The latter is aimed at “resistant subjectivities” (Caygill, 
2013), the “wheel of rebellious violence” (1974/1982, p. 27) in the psyche and ethos 
of the insurgent population. Re-visioning expresses the totalitarian reach of the 
mythographic system of thought, extending the ideal of an integrated core to the 
world at large. 
II. The Violence of the Copula 
Dawn’s report states emphatically that the “highest propaganda is the 
propagation of a new mythology” (1974/1982, p. 25). This involves above all the 
formation of a new “voice,” a resolute, post-Cartesian “voice” forged in a strategic 
military alliance between the law of the father and the co-opted brother-voices of the 
Vietnamese. The counter-myth is deployed as a form of radio propaganda aimed at 
“the psychic reflexes built into traditional Vietnamese culture” (Attwell, 1993, p. 43). 
The actualization of the myth, however, lies beyond psychological warfare in the will 
to power as total war. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that the delusional 
quality of Dawn’s counter-myth blurs the distinction between violence and the voice. 
The idea that psychosis issues from language itself, indeed from a delirious version of 
“our word is our bond,” brings us to the heart of the matter. 
 War generates its own madness. The father-voice, for instance, “utters itself 
appropriately out of the sky. The Vietnamese call it ‘the whispering death’ when it 
speaks from the B-52s, but there is no reason why it should not ride the radio waves 
with equal devastation” (1974/1982, p. 21, emphasis added). The voice thus embodies 
the inherent violence of the copula that pertains in the devitalized relations of 
imperialist warfare and its totalitarian ambition. Dawn articulates a thoroughly 
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disenchanted worldview along these lines, not least of all in his delusional lament for 
the enemy. He pours out his destructive hatred of the enemy as a projection of his 
own despair: “We could have loved them: our hatred for them grew only out of 
broken hopes. We brought them our pitiable selves, trembling on the edge of 
inexistence, and asked only that they acknowledge us. We brought with us weapons, 
the gun and its metaphors, the only copulas we know of between ourselves and our 
objects” (p. 17). 
 As Coetzee aims to make clear in Dusklands, the violence of the copula 
determines the conditions of its own erasure; it continually repeats the reach for 
meaning within the solipsistic limits of its own metaphors of power, even as it 
“probes reality” and the object-world: “We cut their flesh open, we reached into their 
dying bodies…hoping to be washed in their blood…We forced ourselves deeper than 
we had ever gone before into their women; but when we came back we were still 
alone” (p. 180). Dawn’s manic lament reveals the nihilistic depths of his desperate 
search for “transcendent” meaning in a thoroughly disenchanted world. As we shall 
see, Coetzee describes the same underlying pattern of nihilism in both stories: the 
disenchantment of “broken hopes”; a “tragic reach for transcendence” (p. 18); and the 
final recourse to genocidal violence as a type of repetition compulsion. In answer to 
the question that I posed concerning Dawn’s address, it turns out that violence speaks 
in the will to power; indeed, it is not a question of “who speaks” so much as “it 
speaks.” 
III. The Age of Athene 
How is war waged here? There has been a tendency in the critical 
commentaries on Dusklands to emphasize either psychological warfare (Gallagher, 
1991; Attwell, 1993) or military force (Attridge, 2004). I find this dichotomy is 
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misleading. Psychology gives place to the “technical” problem of “victory” 
(1974/1982, p. 28) but only in conjunction with the formation of a counter-myth to 
the prevailing myth of the rebellion of the sons against the tyrant father in Vietnamese 
consciousness. The strategic aim is to counter the prevailing myth, penetrating the 
enemy on both fronts by force and persuasion. In the midst of his manic discourse, 
Dawn clearly acknowledges that total war encompasses “a political air-war whose 
purpose is to destroy the enemy’s capacity to sustain himself psychically” (p. 28). 
The apocalyptic core of genocide is consolidated at the interface of mythos and 
technē. In the myth of rebellion, as Dawn describes it, the alliance formed against the 
tyrannical father involves an incestuous conspiracy between mothers and sons. 
Dawn’s report thus “owes much more to the notion of the ‘primal horde’ in Freud’s 
Totem and Taboo than to any respectable ethnographic description of Viet Cong or 
South Vietnamese traditions” (Attwell, 1993, p. 43). 
 In claiming his authority from the “science of mythography,” Dawn concludes 
that revision is a more effective tactic than replacement. He eschews the identification 
of America with the voice of the father, and evokes instead the “age of Athene” as a 
re-visioning of Vietnamese consciousness. The stage is set for victory along the 
related axes of disciplined, strategic war and total demoralization. On the one hand, 
the virgin goddess of war strategy outplays both the earth goddess and the band of 
brothers in a violent spectacle of total war: “In the Indo-China Theatre we play out 
the drama of the end of the tellurian age and the marriage of the sky-god with his 
parthenogene daughter-queen” (1974/1982, p. 26). The goddess of technē, on the 
other hand, is evoked alongside a covert program of political assassination, a brutal 
assault intent above all on rendering the enemy less than human. The counter-myth is 
realized only at the point of absolute degradation, where force penetrates beyond the 
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community as a whole to each member. Individuals cease to be humans, but are 
marked out rather to die as cattle. 
 The delirium of genocidal violence reaches its crescendo in a “blinding 
moment of ascending meta-historical consciousness” (p. 26), which is reflected in the 
hideous image of a “scurrying swarm” of vermin vibrating only “to the coming of 
death.” In a dark allegory of reading, the madness that would impose order on 
chaos—i. e., through the violence of metaphor—is rendered articulate as post-
religious myth, even as Dawn breaks down and is committed to a mental hospital. 
Based on inchoate fragments of anthropological thought, bits and pieces culled from 
the modern attempt at mythmaking, the fiction nonetheless persists—again, through 
the violence of the copula—as a nihilistic, devitalizing force. The “tragic reach for 
transcendence” goes beyond the pathetic mind that gave shape to it; nor is the author 
himself exempt from the desperate attempt to avoid falling into the abject “place 
where meaning collapses” (Kristeva, 1980/1982, p. 2). By describing the tragic 
pattern of self-consciousness in these terms, Coetzee implicates himself, as well as his 
modern, secular readers, in the same dilemma: shame drives an interminable wish to 
be redeemed in an irrevocably disenchanted world. 
IV. The Colonial Archive 
Dusklands presents the nihilistic delusions of power in the form of myths and 
fables, which inevitably involves encounters with archives. The same basic maneuver 
is employed in both stories, rendering the will to power by reworking the archive as a 
pliable discursive phenomenon rather than an objective historical record. Attwell 
treats this reworking as a form of “parody,” which he sees as the principal critical 
maneuver in both stories (1993, p. 35). As we have seen, the “parodied documents” in 
“The Vietnam Project” issue from the military bureaucracy in a strategic alliance with 
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the Department of Defense. In “The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee,” the parodic 
reworking applies to the documents of colonial expansion and pioneer history 
published by the Van Riebeeck Society (VRS) in South Africa (see Bradlow, 1978). 
In his recourse to these accounts, Coetzee describes himself following “the fortunes 
of the Hottentots in a history written not by them but for them, from above, by 
travelers and missionaries, not excluding my remote ancestor Jacobus Coetzee, floruit 
1760” (1984/1992, p. 52). 
 Coetzee constructs his fictional account of events around the historical details 
presented in these colonial travel narratives. The eighteenth-century journal of Carel 
Frederik Brink, for instance, provides many of the geographical details in the first 
part of “The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee” (see Mossop, 1947). Brink, who was the 
official cartographer and scribe on the 1761-1762 expedition to Namaqualand, also 
describes the death of “a Great Nama” who accompanied Jacobus Coetzee during his 
first expedition in 1760. Coetzee reworks this account into one of the two versions of 
the servant’s death (1974/1982, pp. 93-94); the second version, in which Jacobus 
Coetzee abandons his dying servant, appears to be an alternative reworking from the 
eighteenth-century narrative of William Paterson (Forbes & Rourke, 1980, p. 152). 
 The two versions of the servant’s death draw our attention to the fictional 
nature of the archive and its reworkings. But what do we mean by “reworking”? Like 
Attwell, Susan Gallagher (1991, p. 77) counts the various textual and bibliographical 
aspects of the novella as a “parody” of the Van Riebeek Society. I think this is useful 
as far as it goes; but it seems to me that we need a more comprehensive term than 
“parody” for Coetzee’s treatment of history and historiography. There is something 
more disturbing beneath the mockery in Coetzee’s tone, something more lacerating 
than a satirical imitation: a work of cruelty that amounts to more than a parody of the 
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colonial archive. I propose we use the Freudian notion of “working-through” 
(Durcharbeitung) not, in this case, as a type of psychical work, but rather, as a critical 
aspect of the inner workings of fiction. I think “working-through” is a good example 
of the productive overlap between psychoanalysis and literary fiction. 
 I should like, at this point, to make a further distinction between Coetzee’s 
explicit concern with the colonial archive and his implicit response to apartheid—
indeed, a response that includes assembling “the archival record of the unnameable” 
(Derrida, 1983/2007, p. 377). I suggest that the explicit concern contains the implicit 
response. Thus, in the structure as well as the thematic preoccupations of the 
narrative, Coetzee demonstrates the extent to which the history of the present rests not 
only on eighteenth-century colonial travel narratives but also, more importantly, on 
the contribution of the Afrikaners who shaped these narratives into myths and fables 
in the name of history. Unlike Peter Knox-Shaw (1982), I do not think we can 
maintain a hard and fast distinction here between authentic historical documents and 
fictitious texts. The novelist achieves his “critical intentions with respect to white 
nationalism” (Attwell, 1993, p. 45), precisely by problematizing the authority of the 
archive. 
 The consequent disruption of history and narrative alike serves as a basic 
metafictional technique in Coetzee’s novels: the single identifiable authorial voice of 
the classic realist text is displaced by a plurality of narrative voices with no 
discernible arbiter. In effect, the authorial voice inscribes an abject blankness in its 
place, and as such the novelist finds himself implicated in a particular formation of 
absence. I take it that this is what Pecora means when he refers to “the modern 
saeculum, the world of disgrace or the absence of grace, inhabited by Coetzee’s 
characters and I think by Coetzee as well…it is hard not to think…that Coetzee thinks 
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of himself…as someone who must, especially after apartheid, live in abjection, 
someone who must live in a state without grace” (2015, pp. 87-88). 
 The disgraced life is Coetzee’s central theme, but it is also the predicament in 
which he finds himself. This reading is based on the extent to which Coetzee treats 
history not as a dispassionate object of concern but rather works the very afflictions 
of history into the structure of the novella. History figures above all as a burden, 
something one constantly carries, constructs and reconstructs. Fiction is used, 
accordingly, as a means of working-through the shame of colonial and post-colonial 
violence. As a white South African writer, Coetzee inherits the legacy of Jacobus 
Coetzee in conjunction with the Afrikaner myth of history (see Gallagher, 1991, pp. 
24-31). 
 Again, the structure of the novella reveals the extent to which the legacy is 
inseparable from the myth. The novella includes a translation by one J.M. Coetzee of 
Jacobus Coetzee’s Dutch narrative, together with an Introduction to the narrative by 
the translator’s father, Dr. S.J. Coetzee. The emphases in the Introduction are 
consistent with the ideology of Christian nationalism that emerged in the 1930s and 
1940s in South Africa. The Introduction thus reflects the conservative and 
authoritarian perspective of Afrikaner history; it represents the discursive violence 
that Coetzee brings to the fore through the work of editing and translation. 
Furthermore, the archive reveals the degree to which the novelist and the historian are 
equally implicated in the reworkings of historical narrative. It is incumbent on the 
historian as well as the novelist to engage with the fictions by which we construct and 
make sense of reality. Once again, Coetzee does not place himself above the fray with 
regard to the unwarranted interference in the historical record. He has consistently 
 12 
maintained “that history is not reality; that history is a kind of discourse…that history 
is nothing but a certain kind of story that people agree to tell each other” (1988, p. 4). 
V. Afrikaner Calvinism 
The central achievement of Dusklands consists in rendering brutality in its 
own voice. Violence speaks for itself in the colonial archive as a type of anxiety, 
revealing the identity of psyche and logos in the genocidal will to power. Jacobus 
Coetzee’s narrative begins with the anxiety of self-identity set against the background 
of a shift in the economic and political relations of white settlement: “who is to say 
who copies whom? In hard times how can differences be maintained? We pick up 
their way of life, following beasts around, as they pick up ours…and soon you carry 
the Hottentot smell with you” (1974/1982, p. 57). The anxiety evidently relates to the 
conflict between Khoisan and Boers (burghers reduced to trekkers) over land and 
cattle. Coetzee does not deny the enormous importance of economic pressure and the 
exigencies of money. At the same time, he demonstrates the extent to which 
economic conflict is overdetermined by racism, including the virulent anxiety of 
difference and its maintenance. 
 The political economy of colonialism operates in conjunction with a complex 
discursive relationship of forces that is driven by an inner narrative of anxiety. The 
arrangement is maintained on theological-political grounds with respect to an 
absolute division between the elect, those chosen or set apart by God for salvation, 
and the irreligious horde: “The one gulf that divides us from the Hottentots is our 
Christianity” (p. 57). Jacobus Coetzee’s narrative itself is an overdetermined 
expression of self-consciousness, a racist myth of history, and a theological 
justification of genocidal violence. The violence of frontier terror is pivotal. Coetzee 
holds nothing back in denying himself an authorial voice. Indeed, readers have taken 
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exception to the depiction of violence in this story, seeing it as a type of collusion 
with barbarism (see Know-Shaw, 1982). Salman Rushdie condemned Coetzee’s 
Disgrace on similar grounds, maintaining that the novel “merely becomes part of the 
darkness it describes” (2003, p. 340). I do not share this view of Coetzee’s fiction. 
For me the critical value of the novels—including, In the Heart of the Country, 
Waiting for the Barbarians, and Disgrace—depends on the self-disclosure of 
violence without reserve. 
 There is no question that, in addition to the novels I have just mentioned, 
Dusklands is an extremely brutal work. Whereas Dawn breaks down under the 
pressure of his own catastrophic disillusionment, Jacobus Coetzee assumes the 
burden of history through his delirious appropriation of divine sanction. This involves 
a desperate, and ultimately futile, attempt to articulate the so-called modern mind in a 
world that is haunted by the absence of God. Fragments of modern philosophical and 
theological thinking are yoked together in the form of a violent fable of redemption. 
A post-Cartesian sense of self-consciousness is anxiously identified throughout the 
narrative with the “destiny” of God’s chosen people contra the “empty word” of the 
uncivilized. In this context, Calvinism provided the Afrikaners with the basic 
ideological terms for the division of the elect and the heathens: the identification of 
themselves as a Chosen People in opposition to the indigenous peoples of South 
Africa. It also provides Coetzee with a plausible, if shameful, answer to the question 
of how one might justify evil in the light of God’s goodness, a response that haunts 
the novels from Dusklands onwards. 
 The nationalistic sense of identity in Afrikaner Calvinism is couched in terms 
of a “sacred calling” (De Klerk, 1975, p. 233), which, as Gallagher points out, 
involves modelling Afrikaner history on the history of Israel: “The Great Trek is 
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another Exodus to the Promised Land…The Day of the Covenant marks God’s seal of 
approval for the Afrikaner tribe and its annihilation of the indigenous people” (1991, 
p. 30). It is important to emphasize that the model does not rule against anti-Semitism 
as an extension of racism in South Africa. Jews were in fact excluded from the 
National Party in South Africa up until 1951 and, historically, Afrikaner theological 
nationalism (Templin, 1984) functions as a specific amalgamation of ancient Israel’s 
biblical epic—the conquest of the land of Canaan, the wanderings in the wilderness 
(interior), the promise of land made to Abraham—and the modernity of self-
consciousness as will to power. 
 Accounts differ regarding the Calvinist foundations of Afrikaner nationalism 
and racist ideology. Sheila Patterson (1957), F.A. Van Jaarsveld (1964), W.A. De 
Klerk (1975), T. Dunbar Moodie (1975), and others argue that Afrikaner history was 
first modelled on the Old Testament narrative in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, whereas Irving Hexham (1981) and André Du Toit (1983) date the self-
identification of the Boers as a Chosen People later, to the second half of the 
nineteenth-century. J. Alton Templin (1984, p. 8), however, points out that the ideas 
of “election” and “destiny” were rooted in the colonial notion of “nationhood” and 
the accompanying expressions of popular piety prior to the systematic appropriation 
of theology for racist and nationalist purposes. In any event, Afrikaner political 
theology “inspires its militants with an original form of antisemitism…the 
‘Hebrwistic’ mythology of the Boer people, coming out of its nomadic origins and the 
Great Trek, excludes any other ‘Chosen People’” (Derrida, 1983/2007, p. 384). 
VI. Appropriated Freedom 
Situated in this overdetermined context, “The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee” 
reveals the complex inner workings of violence, particularly in terms of the 
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relationship between the narrative voice and the narrative function. Jacobus Coetzee’s 
insistence that the blacks are “not like us” (1974/1982, p. 59) is repeated as a 
condition of possibility in each and every act of brutality that follows. As we shall 
see, the narrative itself describes and seeks to justify hideous acts of physical violence 
on theological grounds. Further, S.J. Coetzee’s Introduction extends the discursive 
reach of violence in the form of a fable—namely, the fable of the White man in South 
Africa. The mediation of the voice thus systematizes the violence of the Cogito, 
coupled with an anti-Semitic reworking of Israel’s epic, as the founding moment of 
the colonial fable: “The generations of the Coetzees illustrate well the gradual 
dispersal into the hinterland…trekking ever northward in anger or disgust at the 
restrictiveness of government, Dutch or British” (pp. 108-109). 
 Set against the background of the Great Trek into the interior at the beginning 
of the nineteenth-century (in response to British imperialist domination of the Cape), 
and the Anglo-Boer war at the end of the century, Afrikaners increasingly identified 
themselves as a persecuted, but ultimately heroic and triumphant “tribe” (Coetzee, 
1986). The fable of the White man in South Africa supports this identification on 
theological grounds, where “destiny” is expressed as an ideal of appropriated 
freedom. By “appropriated freedom” I mean a type of inner violence in which the 
Afrikaners appropriate the “savage” and “abandoned” freedom of the blacks by 
identification. The ideal serves multiple purposes: faced with the indignity of British 
rule, on the one hand, and the defiance of the blacks, on the other, the Afrikaners, as 
S. J. Coetzee boasts, “believe in justice but have never taken gladly to laws” 
(1974/1982, p. 109). 
 The narrative embodies this so-called “anarchic” attitude in a thoroughly 
ambivalent respect. On the one hand, we are left in no doubt about the “freedom” 
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exercised by the “creators of a People…lost in the veld/but for another Canaan 
elected” (J. D. du Toit, “Totius,” as cited in Hexham, 1981, p. 37). Jacobus Coetzee 
thus asserts that the Bushman is an animal to be hunted; that one’s own humanity is 
measured against the slaughter of something that is less than human. On the other 
hand, the slaying of the Bushman may be read as a primal myth of self-laceration, a 
colonial reworking of Nietzsche’s parable of the madman, who comes looking for 
God and then announces that we have killed Him: “God is dead! God remains dead! 
And we have killed him!” (1887/2001, p. 120) Jacobus Coetzee, straddling the gulf of 
abjection, has blood on his hands from the beginning, while his delirium carries the 
echo of Nietzsche’s madman singing requiem aeternam deo in the face of an “empty 
word.” 
 Coetzee does not spare the reader any more than he spares himself in 
describing how Bushman girls offer a further opportunity for the precarious 
realization of colonial authority and self-identity: “a wild Bushman girl is tied into 
nothing, literally nothing. She may be alive but she is as good as dead. She has seen 
you kill the men who represented power to her, she has seen them shot down like 
dogs. You have become Power itself now and she nothing, a rag you wipe yourself on 
and throw away. She is completely disposable. She is something for nothing, free” 
(1974/1982, p. 61). The word “free”—uttered in the final sentence as a wholly 
perverse presupposition of annihilator anxiety—means nothing more than “free” to 
violate. Rape thus figures simultaneously as an act of self-consciousness, an 
expression of God’s plan, and the paradigmatic instance of power itself as 
appropriated freedom. It is also the grounds for a corrosive disavowal in which 
disgrace silently and repeatedly undoes the violator. 
VII. Abjection 
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The unrelenting violence of the colonial narrative turns on this defining 
encounter with nothingness, in which the violation of “the freedom of the abandoned” 
functions as a twofold projection—including, an appropriation of the freedom of the 
“wild Bushman girl” and an attribution to the uncivilized blacks of an inner discourse 
of forsakenness. This seems to me an especially significant instance of the implicit 
overlap between Dusklands and psychoanalysis. Coetzee himself does not approach 
the world in terms of psychological states of mind. Nevertheless, colonial 
historiography may be seen as a type of projection (Klein, 1946), a defensive 
narrative maneuver against the specter of the “empty word.” In this case, the archival 
figure of the “unnameable” takes the form of what I call a devitalized illusion, 
manifest as such in the fictional movement of self-consciousness: from the perception 
of “the established soul” (1974/1982, p. 72), at the outset of Jacobus Coetzee’s 
narrative, to the subsequent delirium of power under the pressure of its own 
destructiveness and brutality. 
 On his first expedition in 1760, following a somewhat panicked departure 
from the “strange Hottentots,” Jacobus Coetzee wakes early the next morning with a 
fever and, in an attempt to minister to his needs, the servants take him back to the 
camp. His delirium gathers and intensifies en route as he listens to the voices that 
come to him: “There were two voices, one near, one far” (p. 75). Subject to an 
interminable, aporetic call from both “near” and “far”—an internally divided 
summons in which reconciliation with the interior is in conflict with the authoritarian 
order of “civilized barbarism” (Derrida, 1983/2007, p. 386)—the violence of the 
Cogito turns inward, defending itself in the form of delirious voices intent on 
preserving its untouchability: “I carried my secret buried within me. I could not be 
touched” (1974/1982, p. 75). Jacobus Coetzee’s “secret” anticipates the “great secret” 
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of Coetzee’s schooldays, his scandalous, if somewhat arbitrary decision to become a 
Roman Catholic (see Coetzee, 1997, p. 18). 
 If we accept that brutality is its own commentary, this still leaves the question 
of the addressee. To whom does “it” speak? The full extent of the disgraced life 
becomes apparent only when we take account of the addressee. The “untouchable” 
subject of power is overwhelmed by a paranoid encounter with the state of abjection 
into which the other has been cast. Again, I think there is a notable overlap here with 
psychoanalysis, in this case, Julia Kristeva’s (1980/1982) pre-primitive 
phenomenology of abjection, where the drives correlate the not-yet-conceived ego 
with a non-object. The want-to-be (prior to the object world) is thus disclosed as the 
groundless ground of the subject. An inner exclusion issues from the latter in the 
virulent form of maternal hatred devoid of the paternal logos, an “empty word” set up 
in the absence of God. 
 The abject is neither subject nor object but a radically excluded remnant, a 
surviving foreign trace inscribed within the movement of consciousness itself. In the 
narrator’s own words, abjection looms up in terms of “the void dressed up as being” 
(1974/1982, p. 101). It demarcates the place where the reach for meaning comes face 
to face with its own catastrophic collapse. Something irreducibly repulsive, some 
disgusting foreign body, gets under the skin of the subject, in response to which the 
colonial fable offers a final solution on theologico-political grounds. The central 
drama of abjection and redemption, the loss of grace together with the ineradicable 
longing for a permanently foreclosed salvation, is played out as a violent spectacle of 
purification. The latter extends to the point of annihilation in Jacobus Coetzee’s 
narrative. 
VIII. The Delirium of Jacobus Coetzee 
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Coetzee addresses his delirious “sermons” to his servant, Jan Klawer—“good, 
faithful old Jan Klawer.” In the event, the qualities of “goodness” and “faithfulness” 
prove inadequate to compete with the hallucinated visions of power, which threaten 
to subsume the master as well as the servant. In the interminable “delirium upon 
delirium” of the forsaken life, the servant’s incomprehension (Klawer does not seem 
to understand a word that is said to him) doubles his master’s anxieties in the face of 
a “long-absent God” (1974/1982, p. 76). Consequently, self-consciousness is engaged 
in a compulsive act of violence, repeatedly purifying the abject, in a desperate attempt 
to ward off the collapse of the “I am” into the “I am dying” (sum moribundus). 
 The delirious thinking that underpins the narrative occupies a pivotal position 
between the so-called modern mind (“I am”), on the one hand, and the mirror image 
of its own abjection, on the other. The latter takes the form of an “object” that appears 
from the beginning to be “as good as dead.” As such, delirium forms the colonial 
counterpart to the apocalyptic core of genocide in Dawn’s imperialist counter-myth. 
In both cases, the Cogito’s own “negligible phantoms” (p. 18) and perverse figures 
reach no further than the murderous energies of an interminable claustration (Meltzer, 
1992/2008). Sequestered in the menstruation hut (the place of abjection) in a state of 
degradation and irredeemable shame, Coetzee meditates upon his life in a series of 
delirious thoughts: ranging from “the explorer’s hammer blow” levelled at the 
“interior” to various thoughts concerning dreams, the alterity of the other and the 
object-world, and the spatial relations of master and savage. In a grotesque reworking 
of Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy, the anxiety that drives these thoughts 
concerns the nature of thinking itself, the hideous possibility that there is no reality to 
probe and violate, no freedom to appropriate, nothing to the lure of rape or the 
enticement to penetrate, other than mere fictions and fables. 
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 As analysts, we will be familiar with patients whose exhaustive obsessional 
maneuvers are played out on the edge of a despair that threatens to become all-
consuming. Our more disturbed obsessive patients, therefore, continue to wander the 
interior on the threshold of the object world or, as Kristeva puts it, at the limit of 
primal repression: “On such limits and at the limit one could say that there is no 
unconscious, which is elaborated when representations and affects (whether or not 
tied to representations) shape a logic” (1980/1982, pp. 10-11). Coetzee’s protagonists 
come up with different versions of this abject re-enactment, different ways of dealing 
with the excess of the persecutory object. On the one hand, in an increasingly 
desperate attempt to ward off unthinkable anxieties, Dawn scrabbles after fragments 
of anthropological thought. Jacobus Coetzee, on the other hand, stakes his claim on 
history grounded in God’s judgement, which, as he insists, “is just, irreprehensible, 
and incomprehensible” (1974/1982, p. 106). 
 Coetzee uses fiction to enact its own anxiety precisely at the intersection of 
our Cartesian modernity and our disgraceful exposure amidst the tombs and 
sepulchres of God. The two stories in Dusklands are equally haunted by the following 
questions: How do we know there is anything more to the world than the features we 
ascribe to it? How can we ever be absolutely certain that our senses are not deceiving 
us, that we are not dreaming? And is there any guarantee that our convictions are not 
the result of a demon at work in our minds? The responses available in answer to 
these questions, as well as the questions themselves, depend on particular historical 
horizons of intelligibility. According to Coetzee, we are where we are without 
promise of grace and with an ineradicable longing for the transcendent. Writing from 
within, as well as about, the South African situation, Coetzee thus presents the 
anxiety of historiography, linking the rhetorical claustrophobia of the modern subject 
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to the writing of history. The Cartesian drama of self-consciousness is reworked as a 
form of persecutory anxiety, in a desperate and despairing response to which colonial 
genocide offers a “last defense against isolation” (p. 79). 
 I do not think Coetzee would have us read Dusklands as an explanation of 
either colonialism or apartheid. He is concerned rather with fictions of inner violence 
and brutality, including the extremes to which “white writing” is prepared to go in its 
defense against intergenerational anxiety and shame. Nadine Gordimer (1988), Lewis 
Nkosi (1981), and others are critical of the way in which so-called experimental 
fiction and the South African avant garde, particularly the group of Afrikaans writers 
known as the “Sestigers,” reduce history to a metaphysical game. A similar criticism 
could be levelled at Coetzee and his explicit commitment to the legacy of European 
literary modernism. His novels are certainly more experimental than realistic. And yet 
it seems to me that Coetzee turns the critical argument against itself, incorporating 
history and metaphysics alike into the inner workings of the colonial narrative. He 
does not start from the assumption that fiction has to measure up to the demands of 
history. On the contrary, history is seen as part of the problem rather than as an 
objective criterion by which deviations from literary realism and liberal humanist 
ideology may be found wanting. 
 Most importantly, through his use of narrative voice, Coetzee reveals the 
extent to which the defense against persecutory anxiety fails, and fails horribly, in its 
own terms. Driven to ever more brutal acts of violence, colonial mastery ends up with 
nothing to master. At the same time, it remains haunted by the nihilated remnants, or 
discarded rags, of its own projections. The abject, as Kristeva points out, “has only 
one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I” (1980/1982, p. 1). In this 
respect, the essential drama of colonialism, understood as an interminable work of 
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violent opposition, is summed up in the following statement: “I am not a Hottentot” 
(1974/1982, p. 95). In this terse announcement of his own solipsistic predicament, the 
narrator condemns himself through a negative fusion, that is, at the point where the “I 
am” and the “I am not” coalesce. The coalescence is a construct of colonial 
historiography, and as such remains embedded in the Afrikaner’s myth of history. 
The colonial archive reveals the extent to which thinking posits itself in extremis as 
an interminable form of persecutory anxiety, a discursive maneuver of white 
nationalist history haunted by the surviving remnants of its own brutality. The 
paranoid logic of that history, which is evident from the moment that the subject is 
faced with an “empty word” rather than another human being, is consolidated in the 
course of Jacobus Coetzee’s meditative delirium. 
 The retaliatory violence of the second expedition confirms the futility of 
colonial power, but otherwise adds nothing to what is already set out in the 
meditations. Taken together, Jacobus Coetzee’s delirious visions reveal the full extent 
of his fear that nothing will come of the will to power, save the endless pouring out of 
its own despair in yet more futile acts of cruelty. Most notably, in the central 
meditation on the alterity of the other, Coetzee identifies himself with the gun 
understood as a “metaphysical” principle—namely, as a “mediator” and means of 
“salvation.” The violence of the copula, which extends throughout Dusklands, 
accedes to the status of an onto-theological principle in Coetzee’s delirium, hence the 
figure of “the hare that pants out its life at one’s feet.” The death of the other is 
simultaneously the condition of one’s own integrity and the source of endless 
torment. The “death of the hare” is supposed to be a symbolic means of preservation, 
and as such constitutes the eschatological ideal of the inner narrative of violence. The 
fictional movement of consciousness aims to realize itself on these grounds: “The 
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death of the hare is the logic of salvation. For either he was living out there and is 
dying into a world of objects, and I am content; or he was living within me and would 
not die within me…the death of the hare is my metaphysical meat…The hare dies to 
keep my soul from merging with the world’ (1974/1982, pp. 79-80, emphasis added). 
In the event, as we will see, the symbol and the principle alike prove insignificant. 
IX. The Gospel of the Sparrow 
In the second of the two expeditions that he describes in his narrative, Jacobus 
Coetzee relies on “the logic of salvation” for the “sermon” that he delivers before 
executing the servants who deserted him on the first expedition. He tells his servants 
that there is no requirement of God to be good, which is to say, we cannot merit 
anything from the hand of God, but yet we may ask not to be forgotten. Who 
authorizes these words and this deed? As Gallagher (1991, p. 68) points out, most of 
Jacobus Coetzee’s biblical allusions refer to the Pentateuch, evoking a wrathful rather 
than a merciful God. Similarly, Templin (1984) argues that, contrary to orthodox 
Reformed thought, the assumption that Christ is prefigured in the Old Testament does 
not pertain in South Africa. However, the general state of affairs notwithstanding, it 
seems to me that Jacobus Coetzee’s narrative presupposes a Christological 
dimension. I do not mean to diminish the severity of the narrative tone. In fact, the 
inner difficulty of disgrace actually deepens with the narrator’s attempt to reconcile 
two traditions of Christian confession: Calvinist election and the New Beginning in 
Christ.  
 The Christological dimension augments the paranoid defense: for all who will 
live in Christ must suffer persecution, and yet this cannot take away God’s gift of 
salvation and the saving of man from the power and penalty of sin. Coetzee’s sermon 
is couched in the gospel of Matthew, and the message promises salvation not only for 
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the condemned “heathen,” but more importantly for the evangelical so “afflicted” 
(Matt. 24.9): “And ye shall be hated of all men for my name’s sake: but he that 
endureth to the end shall be saved” (Matt. 10.22). The delirium persists in and 
through the act of saving, that is, where Jacobus Coetzee preaches the gospel of the 
sparrow to the deserters before pronouncing sentence of death over them: “Are not 
two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without 
your Father” (Matt. 10.29). 
 In this case, the “gospel of the kingdom” (Matt. 24.13) extends its reach no 
further than the anxiety of the subject having to come face to face with its own 
projection of nothingness. The intolerance of a no-thing, or loss of faith in the 
mystery of the “empty word,” characterizes the inner workings of brutality as a type 
of megalomania. As Bion states, “actual murder is to be sought instead of the thought 
represented by the word ‘murder’” (1965/1984, p. 82). The essential means of 
preserving oneself is no longer available in this parody of the Hegelian dialectic, 
where the figure of the other panting out its life at one’s feet fails to stand up. 
 The contempt pours out of Jacobus Coetzee at this point in a final reckoning 
with an object world rendered abject by the unrestrained exercise of murderous 
power. Summing up his lot in a statement that is full of hatred and despair, the 
narrator describes how two condemned men, the Tamboer brothers, went as docile 
bodies to their death, “nonentities swept away on the tide of history;” how a third, 
Plaatje, “knew he was dead” and did not “bother to plead;” and how the last of the 
deserters, Adonis, “whom I had always suspected I would one day despise…panted at 
my feet” (1974/1982, p. 101). In a final twist of persecutory logic, death cannot be 
pronounced over those who are already as good as dead: “this abject, treacherous 
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rabble was telling me that here and everywhere else on this continent there would be 
no resistance to my power and no limit to its projection” (p. 101). 
 Fearing the specter of the “undifferentiated plenum”—the fate that he assumes 
awaits him and his fellow “countrymen”—Jacobus Coetzee can count on the deserters 
neither alive nor dead. As far as he is concerned, they have proved themselves 
“inadequate” to the onto-theological strictures of power; their deaths have failed to 
body forth the object world in the manner of God’s good creatures, the dead hare and 
the fallen sparrow. Consequently, salvation degenerates into the prospect of eternal 
punishment on the grounds that “[t]here was nothing that could be impressed on these 
bodies, nothing that could be torn from them or forced through their orifices, that 
would be commensurate with the desolate infinity of my power over them” (pp. 101-
102). While the estimate of defiance is grossly askew, it nonetheless stands as a 
defining statement of the disgraced life, according to which the value of nothing—
understood as an “optimum expectation” (Grotstein, 2007, p. 325)—is no longer a 
vital part of reality. 
X. Nihilism 
What is Jacobus Coetzee going to do now? The question posed itself along 
these lines, under the heading of “apartheid,” as the abject underside of postwar 
history. The word “apartheid” itself occupies inner and outer reality “like a 
concentration camp” (Derrida, 1983/2007, p. 378). Thus, according to the “logic” of 
his own testimony, there are no moves left for the racist evangelical explorer, save the 
static repetition of an enraged vision. The narrative has come full circle. In place of 
an ending, it repeats the exemplary and inaugural act of violation with which the 
colonial reach for meaning simultaneously announced and erased itself. The rape of 
Bushman girls is repeated in a scene of symbolic oral rape that remains among the 
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most barbarous passages in Coetzee: “I held the muzzle of my gun against [Adonis’s] 
forehead. ‘Stand up!’ His face was quite empty…I pushed the muzzle against his lips. 
‘Take it’, I said. He would not take it. I stamped [on his chest]. His lips seeped blood, 
his jaw relaxed. I pushed the muzzle in till he began to gag. I held his head steady 
between my ankles…The shot sounded as minor as a shot fired into the sand” 
(1974/1982, p. 104). 
 The stark minimalism of the prose in this passage conveys the abyss of horror, 
the identification of the “empty word” with an “empty face.” At this point the 
narrative terminates in a series of anxious questions rather than an achieved end. The 
questions give voice to the repetitive spasms of violence that mark the resentful 
termini of colonial power. Thus, Jacobus Coetzee asks himself whether it is possible 
that he has killed something of “inestimable value.” The answer is predictable 
enough, even if the prediction is grotesque: the inscrutability of the Hottentots is seen 
as justification for their annihilation and for the disposal of the docile bodies of the 
servants. But does this amount to anything? Were the deaths of all these people worth 
anything? It is scandalous to raise the question of value in these terms, but in doing so 
we appreciate the comprehensive reach of the calculus of power. Again, it is 
essentially a question of “metaphysical meat,” the death of the other as a condition of 
the object world: “Through their deaths I…again asserted my reality” (p. 106). And in 
a compulsive effort to ward off the solipsism of his own “empty word” (the 
intolerance of nothingness as the horror of aloneness), the evangelical narrator 
assumes his “mission” by taking it upon himself “to be the one to pull the trigger.” 
 Identifying the self in this way with History leaves one final set of questions, 
in all probability the defining questions in a post-religious age: Can the avenger look 
forward to nothing but suffering? What does it mean to live without grace? The 
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narrator hastily dismisses the specter of his own death as a mere fiction only to reveal 
a yet more corrosive anxiety, namely, the impossibility of dying—the dying that 
comes from the life that one has lived, as distinct from simply perishing amidst the 
“undifferentiated plenum” and “nonentities” of history. Freedom to die one’s own 
death is ruled out by the devitalized illusions of the evangelical butcher. Indeed, the 
devitalization is evident not only in the narrator’s attitude towards the “impenetrable” 
interiority of the other, but also, more importantly, in his perception of his own 
superfluity and the overall senselessness of being. The delirium of Jacobus Coetzee 
reveals, above all, the extent to which living and dying have never been of any real 
concern or consequence to him. 
 Together with the narrator’s inability to tolerate the “empty word” in its 
manifest unknowability, or to accept the interrupting presence of absence rather than 
falling into it, the narrative moves relentlessly and inexorably towards the dreadful 
realization that nothing matters. Imagination itself is brought low by the reality of 
colonialism and its unprecedented coarseness, the lowest of the low. As Jacobus 
Coetzee admits, the “failure of imagination before the void” (p. 102) is complete and 
horribly coherent. No meaning takes place here. The reach for meaning doesn’t 
extend beyond “the catastrophic residues of a mind withdrawn from itself” (Grotstein, 
2007, p. 323). The brutalization of the disgraced life thus extends from the asthma of 
the dying animal to the logic of salvation, the desolation of eternal punishment, and 
the static repetition of violence. And yet while the narrative voice is exhausted in this 
fourfold pattern of movement, the novella is not yet complete. 
XI. The Colonial Fable 
It remains for the historian to reclaim a life that would otherwise be 
committed to nihilism. The task falls to S.J. Coetzee as editor and author of the 
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afterword. The narrative is thus reworked as a fable that in its redemptive reach forms 
the counterpart to Dawn’s mythology. The delirium, which drives the narrative voice 
to the point of meaninglessness, is deliberately excised on the level of narrative 
function. The reach for meaning is conveyed through the latter on the one hand as “a 
work of piety toward an ancestor” and on the other as a work of revisionist 
historiography levelled at the “distortions” that have compromised “our conception of 
the great age of exploration” (1974/1982, p. 108). This is one of a series of related 
excisions, which form an essential part of the novella and which Coetzee manages 
through a consistently subtle interplay of voice and function as different levels of 
narrative discourse. The combined work of piety and history constitutes the fable 
(“the outward story”) of the White man in South Africa journeying ever northward 
into the interior. The disgraced life is haunted by “the failure of imagination” itself; it 
requires, therefore, “a positive act of imagination” (p. 109) in order to restore 
narrative meaning. An imaginative understanding of this particular white man—an 
“extraordinary man” (p. 121)—is presented as a fictional double, a mirror image, of 
the future that he had envisaged in his own imaginative understanding of the 
civilizing process. 
 The “imagination” unfolds as a work of violence in historiographical as well 
as fictional discourse, where the inner narrative of brutality is reworked 
retrospectively (together with the Calvinist origins of Afrikaner nationalism) as a 
fable of disobedience and redemptive reprimand. On the one hand, the ruthless 
exploitation of the interior is re-presented in terms of “a necessary loss of innocence,” 
that is, on the model of man’s shameful fall and punishment in Genesis, chapter 3. 
The archival record of nameless dread (Bion, 1970/1984, p. 46) is consistently 
authorized by Scripture: “The Company’s men were only playing the role of the angel 
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with the flaming sword in this drama of God’s creation” (1974/1982, p. 110). On the 
other hand, the evolution of the “herd” step by step towards “citizenship of the world” 
forms the other half of the fable, which rests on the Calvinist Protestant belief that 
Christ gave his life as a sacrifice for the elect so that they may be redeemed from their 
sin. 
 The doctrine of the Fall, coupled with the idea of God’s protecting his people 
at the expense of others (favoring some over others), underpins the central maneuver 
of the narrative function. Jacobus Coetzee’s journey north of the Great River, and his 
second expedition with Hendrik Hop, are thereby claimed for “the annals of 
exploration” (p. 12), while at the same time completely cleared of an any “genocidal” 
motives (p. 114). Based on providential theology, and combined with the assumption 
that “Man’s thrust into the future is history” (p. 12, emphasis added), the fable of the 
White man in South Africa is presented as a redemptive work of revision on an epic 
scale. The endeavor repeatedly comes to nothing: yoked together as a combined work 
of history and theology, the colonial fable continually undoes itself through its own 
murderous energies. 
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